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ABSTRACT 
This article addresses the need for cognitive science to loop back and examine its roots and 
presuppositions, pointing out the three recursive issues: 1.) The observer effect or how observing a 
phenomenon affects the phenomenon that is being observed, an issue that has been acknowledged by 
natural science, which cognitive science attempts to emulate, and empirical phenomenology, but not 
cognitive science itself; 2.) Human kinds or how our research affects us, the researchers, and society 
(people’s self-understandings), an issue which forms a loop with the observer effect – observation thus 
changing the observed, the observer, as well as itself, and 3.) The dangers of over-eager extrapolation 
or how complexity is lost during shifts in explanatory level, issues pertaining to using findings from 
studies of one explanatory level (e.g. experiments with rats) to inform a different explanatory level 
(issues within human society). Finally, the article presents a fourth recursive loop which presents a 
potential solution to the above: a self-correcting mechanism that allows science to recursively correct 
its mistakes and improve on its own work. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Upon reaching a dead end, the only way forward is back. One has to retrace one’s steps and 
investigate the path that has led up to that point, so that a more viable way may be found. This 
is also true in science, and doubly so in cognitive science, where its constituting disciplines 
present a myriad of branching, joining and again diverging paths. So let us loop back (a 
phrase that shall become the leitmotif of this article) to the roots of these paths in order to see 
where we came from and whether there is perhaps a dead end ahead. 
The cognitive revolution [1] that gave rise to cognitive science traces its roots to cybernetics – 
one of the first modern interdisciplinary fields that attempted to study the mind with the 
computational methods of the rapidly developing fields of computer science and artificial 
intelligence. It was then that the idea took root to liken the mind to a computer [2], processing 
information from an input (stimuli) into an appropriate output (behaviour). Some 25 years 
after the birth of the information-processing (IP) analogy, the young and upcoming field of 
neuroscience came to fore, uncovering the hardware behind the software that has been (and 
still is) laid out by psychology, linguistics and anthropology.  
There were (and still are), however, problems that provide quite an explanatory challenge if 
they are to be phrased in an IP framework (but one of many prominent examples of these 
problems being illustrated by [3], see also [4-6]). While these problems are not exactly dead 
ends, they are sufficient to evoke doubt in the explanatory power of the IP metaphor – a 
metaphor that while providing a relatively simple and vivid illustration of some issues, it 
obfuscates others. Increased awareness of the IP metaphor’s (and through it, cognitive 
science’s) limitations and problems gave birth to new explanatory frameworks such as 
embodied, embedded, extended, enactive or affective cognition (see e.g. [7, 8]). 
However, not all issues have been resolved. The emergence of competing theories does not 
mean a complete transition away from the IP metaphor. Even if it did, these theories do not 
address all the problems that cognitive science struggles with. Some of these issues shall be the 
topic of this special issue of INDECS, wherein we shall focus on select methodological and 
epistemological challenges, such as those of the recursive character of cognitive systems – started 
by this article and continued by T. Strle [9] – of different ways of modelling and their validity, 
from computer modelling – see T. Kolenik [10] – to thought experiment – M. Malec [11] – 
and the challenges the notion of probability poses for metaphysics – P. Lukan [12].  
This particular article shall attempt to serve as connecting tissue between these topics, though 
its main two focuses shall mainly be: the recursive nature of research in cognitive science, 
and the importance of being mindful of how the paths we take and investigations we perform 
loop back towards us (the meaning of this shall, hopefully, become clearer throughout this 
article). Four recursions or loops shall be addressed, the first three representing challenges in 
research of complex phenomena (i.e., the mind), the last representing a potential solution – or 
at least the promise of one – to all challenges: 
1) The observer effect – how observing a phenomenon affects the phenomenon that is being 
observed. 
2) Human kinds – how our research affects us, the researchers, and society – in the sense of 
people’s self-understandings. 
3) From simplification to extrapolation – how complexity is lost during shifts in explanatory 
level. 
4) The self-correcting mechanism: how science recursively corrects its mistakes and 
improves on its own work. 
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THE OBSERVER EFFECT 
Natural science holds the prestigious position of the human endeavour that uncovers the 
secrets of the universe ‘as it is’. Aspiring to likewise uncover the secrets of the mind ‘as it is’, 
cognitive science aims to emulate natural science by imitating its methods. Thus, cognitive 
science’s methods (in general) tend towards an experimental design, isolating a single 
(quantifiable) variable and controlling all other parameters, until finally, through rigorous 
statistical analysis, relationships between variables can be determined. The quantities that 
constitute the explanatory apparatus of science must be as few and as well defined as possible 
to still describe the whole system, while the measurement must be such that it disturbs the 
system in the least possible amount, thus producing a clean, pristine quantity, without 
disturbing other important parameters. These are (some of the) ideals of psychological and 
neuroscientific research. 
But apparently unbeknownst to the core of scientific community within cognitive science, 
some odd 100 years ago, physics (the non plus ultra of natural science) has come to the 
realisation that the idea of measurement as extracting a quantity out of reality is not always 
viable. Within the realm of quantum physics, when measuring a phenomenon, it does not 
behave the same way as it would when it is not being measured (see e.g. [13]) – this has been 
dubbed the observer effect. Moreover, the very physicist who first articulated this realisation, 
Niels Bohr [14], postulates that the observer effect also applies to measurement within 
psychology, all the while psychologists cling to assumptions about the nature of measurement 
that physicists have long let go. 
It needs to be conceded that the basic idea of the observer effect is not completely alien to the 
field of psychology: a similar effect has been noticed and dubbed “demand characteristics” [15]. 
A participant in a study is aware that they are in an experimental situation and act 
accordingly: they try to be a ‘good participant’ in that they willingly perform the tasks as they 
think it is expected of them. These perceived expectations and the behaviour they elicit differs 
from participant to participant [15]. Perhaps the most illustrative and recent study showing the 
consequences of demand characteristics is the one by R. Hurlburt et al. [16], where fMRI 
images were taken of people during inner speech, with there being difference in brain 
activations between spontaneous occurrences of inner speech and on-demand performances. 
Yet studies such as this one are an exception. Demand characteristics are not often 
acknowledged in psychological or neuroscientific research, and if they are, they are a thing to 
be minimized [17]. 
There is, however, a field of research within cognitive science that pays greater attention to 
the difference between measured and unmeasured phenomena, the young and burgeoning 
field of experience research, also known as empirical phenomenology. Besides collaborating 
with other fields to reveal the effects of demand characteristics (as it did in the previous 
illustration thereof, Hurlburt et al., 2016), it also acknowledges the observer effect within its 
own field of experience research, speaking of an “excavation fallacy” [18], which describes 
the issue that exploring experience deforms, distorts or even wholly creates the experience 
one purports to examine. 
How, then, do we deal with the observer effect and the various forms it takes throughout 
cognitive science? It is yet unclear how (or even whether) it would be possible to be rid of the 
effect altogether, but ignoring it or trying to minimise the effect are both approaches of 
questionable potency. Empirical phenomenology seems so far to be the only field (besides 
quantum mechanics itself) to have properly acknowledged the seriousness of this issue and 
formulated a response (cf. [19]). U. Kordeš and E. Demšar [20] suggest that the excavation 
fallacy should be rephrased as an excavation characteristic – meaning that the effect becomes 
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itself something to be studied. We have to leave it to our fourth loop to apply this same 
approach to the other fields within cognitive science, but as the example of Hurlburt et al. [16] 
indicates, baby steps are being made. 
HUMAN KINDS 
An effect similar to the observer effect can be detected between science and society – a 
relationship that can be caricaturised as, again, between observer and the observed, but this 
time focused on how observation changes the observer themselves. To better understand this 
interplay Ian Hacking [21] provides the terms natural and human kinds. 
Natural kinds are the typically well defined, context independent, and not (too) 
interconnected concepts or kinds usually found in the natural sciences – such as gravity, 
force, electric charge, etc. Human kinds, on the other hand, tend to be understood only within 
a specific context, appear in groups with interwoven meanings, with shifting or flexible 
definitions – e.g. virtue, morality, love, decision-making, etc. Our definitions and descriptions 
of human kinds are influenced by how we experience them, which is reciprocally affected by 
the definitions and descriptions of the greater societal discourse we are contributing to. 
Human kinds are found in every-day discourse and the humanities, as well as, despite its 
efforts, in psychology and cognitive science. 
To reiterate: many of the phenomena researched by cognitive science are intrinsically 
dependent on our intuitions1, all the while our use of those terms shapes the very intuitions 
the definitions of those phenomena depend on. The relationship between research, resulting 
constructs, those constructs’ effect on social sense-making, and, in turn, social 
sense-making’s effect on research, is not yet sufficiently understood (though attempts have 
been made, see e.g. [9, 22]). 
The previously described issues concerning the observer effect and human kinds come full 
circle: measurement (or observation) is not a simple extraction of data, but an act that itself 
changes the phenomenon being observed. Similarly, the observation’s results shape how the 
phenomenon is understood in the greater societal discourse, which loops back, affecting the 
observer’s intuitions, which shape their observation. To simplify these two loops into one: 
observation (measurement, research) changes both the observed and the observer (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. The recursive nature of observation. 
The recursive and self-referential nature of research makes a simple transfer of methodologies 
found in natural science to the fields of research on the mind exceptionally difficult. Even 
more so as different fields deal in different levels of explanation, such as molecules, cells, 
individuals, societies and cultures. Methodologies employed to study molecules are 
questionably effective for studying individuals thus the findings from, for example 
thermodynamics cannot easily be translated into how the mind works (though respectable 
attempts have been made, cf. [23]). 
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FROM SIMPLIFICATION TO EXTRAPOLATION 
In trying to study the mind by means of natural science means to transfer information 
between different levels of explanation and complexity, distorting information along the way. 
The transfer goes two ways, which shall here be described as ‘simplification’2 (from a 
‘higher’ level to a ‘lower’ one) and ‘extrapolation’ (vice versa). Studying the mind usually 
involves shifts in both directions: first simplification, then extrapolation. 
As mentioned before, the most ‘prestigious’ way of research, which cognitive science is 
striving towards, is that of natural science. So the first step of researching a given 
phenomenon is to ‘simplify’ it, distilling it into few, easy to measure (quantifiable) variables. 
However, while, for example, simplifying water temperature into degrees Celsius is rather 
straight forward, the same cannot be said for complex cognitive phenomena such as decision 
making, empathy or morality. 
Similar concerns have already been raised in biology under the name of epistemological 
reduction [24], questioning whether, for example, all of evolution can be explained solely by 
genes. Our concerns regarding simplification take a similar direction, perhaps going even a 
bit further. We do not only question whether phenomena such as empathy can be sufficiently 
explained by, for example, activations of certain neurons, but what (information) is lost when 
one distils or simplifies empathy into neuronal activity? The question is thus: how does one 
even go about transforming complex and ambiguous phenomena into simple, well-defined 
variables? We would argue that it is impossible to do so without losing a significant amount 
of nuance and complexity – which in turn makes the transfer back from the lower level of 
explanation onto a higher one (extrapolation) problematic, as one might have lost something 
integral in the process (an idea not dissimilar to incommensurability [25]). Yet the 
extrapolative jump to conclusions is well employed in the social system of science: results 
from studies are framed as relevant in the broader societal context, which changes how 
society understands itself, how individuals understand themselves, and how some of those 
individuals – the scientists – understand the phenomena they are researching. From observing 
how neurons that fire when a monkey eats a banana also fire when the monkey sees another 
monkey eat a banana [26], we (humanity as a whole) are quick to posit ‘answers’ to ‘big’ 
questions of cognition such as empathy or even love. 
An illustrative example of the dangers of over-eager extrapolation is the now famous experiment 
with rats whose brains had been wired to a lever so that, upon pressing the lever, their reward 
centres were stimulated [27]. Once the rig had been figured out, the rats would press the lever 
continuously, thousands of times per hour, day after day. In similar studies, it has been shown 
that these more direct forms of stimulation (intravenous cocaine or direct electrical brain 
stimulation) were preferred even over food, resulting in the rats’ eventual starvation [28]. 
These findings were kindling for the fires of reckless explanation. Their conclusions were 
immediately applied to humans: that our other survival instincts bow to the tyrannical rule of 
our rewards system. There is no hope for wholesome living – for as long as drugs are 
available, addiction and ruin are inevitable. Such have we divined from rats. 
However, the cogs of science ground on. A subsequent study [29] introduced a control group. 
While one group of rats was kept, just like in the previous studies, in a small cage, the other 
group had a pen with numerous toys, ample food and lots of room for playing and mating – a 
so-called ‘rat park’. Both groups started off addicted to morphine and given a free choice of 
regular water or morphine solution. As by then expected, the caged rats gorged themselves on 
the drug. But, surprisingly, the park rats seemed to prefer regular water [29], indicating that 
addiction might be stymied by a sufficiently stimulating environment. The previous 
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extrapolation that the rewards system subjugates all other instincts was thus challenged, thus 
also pointing out how problematic it is to infer complex environmentally dependent cognitive 
dynamics from studies accommodating necessarily reductive and ‘simplifying’ methodology 
(which tries to negate environmental impact as much as possible). 
The here elucidated issue with simplification and (reckless) extrapolation is concerning for 
the whole of cognitive science. Is the cognition that is researched in the lab the same one that 
occurs ‘in the wild’? If (cognitive) science needs to distil every phenomenon into a 
measurable variable, can it still be said that it is researching that very phenomenon, or is it but 
studying a homeopathic solution of questionable potency and ecological validity3? 
THE SELF-CORRECTING MECHANISM 
The heretofore presented issues paint a grim and pessimistic picture. It seems that whatever 
step we take, however far we loop back, we are surrounded by dead ends and every time we 
try to move to a different road it turns out to be on a different (explanatory) level. Is there 
really no hope to someday find our way to the truth about the mind? 
It would be only fair to concede at this point that the hitherto used metaphor of branching 
paths and stepping forward is, though illustrative, somewhat deceiving as far as the nature of 
scientific progress is concerned. Science is not in the business of discovering reality, but in 
negotiating with the environment, or as Bertrand Russell [30; p.15] puts it: 
“Science thus encourages the abandonment of the search for absolute truth, and 
the substitution of what may be called “technical” truth, which belongs to any 
theory that can be successfully employed in inventions or in predicting the future. 
“Technical” truth is a matter of degree: a theory from which more successful 
inventions and predictions spring is truer than one which gives rise to fewer. 
“Knowledge” ceases to be a mental mirror of the universe, and becomes merely a 
practical tool in the manipulation of matter.” 
If we subject the whole endeavour of science to this criterion of “technical” truth – that is, 
whether its theories can be successfully employed – we find ourselves before a staggering 
mass of evidence for its efficacy. How then do we console our analyses of its numerous flaws 
with its resounding success? How can it be riddled with mistakes and still grind on, spewing 
out better and better theories? The answer is exactly thus: it continues to spew out better and 
better theories, all the while looping back, correcting past mistakes and improving or 
discarding and substituting past theories that no longer appear to hold water. 
This is science’s self-correcting mechanism: a culture of falsification [31], replicability and 
peer-review – a culture of testing, retesting and gathering of new data to support or disprove. 
R. Feynman characterised science as “belief in the ignorance of experts” [32; p.315]. All this 
is done in an attempt to cover all the blind spots, account for biases and rectify past mistakes. 
The institutionalized self-correcting process was already evident in our previous example 
with rats: scientists put the work of their peers under close scrutiny, found shortcomings, and 
developed a better experiment. The new experiment in turn was put under close scrutiny that 
revealed shortcomings (cf. [33, 34]), and the cycle of re-examination continues. 
Through this very same process, cognitive science – even from way before it was called that –
 evolved from a sole interest in the relationship between stimulus and behaviour 
(behaviourism), to an interest in the brain and how it processes information (information-
processing metaphor) and now to tendencies towards embodied and social aspects of the 
mind. Finally, in the past few decades, the phenomenological or first-person perspective is 
being taken into account as well (for example, in the form of enactivism, see [7, 35]). 
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The self-correcting mechanism is perhaps science’s strongest virtue. It allows science to 
constantly loop back and improve itself in the face of new data, to question perhaps out-dated 
metaphors, to re-evaluate the very nature of measurement and observation, to become aware 
of its own effect on society and society’s effect on scientific work, and of the dangers of 
shifting between different levels of explanation. What is more, this mechanism built into the 
scientific process itself, so change need not be brought about by outside intervention. To 
overthrow a misruling despot within science – perhaps in the form of a common metaphor or 
a leading theory – there is no need for an armed militia to instigate a violent revolution. 
Science constantly revolutionises itself. The “governance” of a leading theory is thoroughly 
and ceaselessly being questioned by the very proponents of that theory and their peers. Thus, 
we invite the reader to do just that. Peruse this text (and this issue, this journal, other 
journals, …) and scrutinize the contents, be mindful of the problems described (t)herein in so 
far as they apply to your work, and do not hesitate to call us out on what we ourselves have 
missed. The descent into placid naivety can, after all, be ever so seductive. 
REMARKS 
1A prominent example of our intuitions shaping our research is found in computer modeling. 
1The issue known as Pac-Man effect [36] brings to attention that, to simplify, it is always the 
1one making the computer model that determines what is food that should be sought out and 
1what are predators that should be avoided, not the agent itself (see also [10]). 
2That is not to say that phenomena and their explanations are simple in the colloquial sense 
2(anyone trying to wrap their head around quantum mechanics can attest to that), just that less 
2“other factors” (such as the environment) need to be accounted for or ignored when 
2researching them. 
3See also Strle [37] for similar claims in the domain of decision-making. 
REFERENCES 
[1] Gardner, H.: The mind’s new science: A history of the cognitive revolution. 
Basic Books, New York, 1987, 
[2] Searle, J.R.: Cognitive Science and the Computer Metaphor. 
In: Negrotti, M., ed.: Understanding the Artificial: On the Future Shape of Artificial Intelligence. 
Artificial Intelligence and Society. Springer, London, 1991, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-1776-6_8, 
[3] Held, R. and Hein A.: Movement-produced stimulation in the development of visually 
guided behavior. 
Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology 56(5), 872-876, 1963, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/h0040546, 
[4] Hardcastle, V.G.: A critique of information processing theories of consciousness. 
Minds and Machines 5(1), pp.89-107, 1995, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00974191, 
[5] Norman, D.A.: Twelve issues for cognitive science. 
Cognitive Science 4(1), 1-32, 1980, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1207/s15516709cog0401_1, 
[6] Thagard, P.: Cognitive Science. 
In: Zalta, E.N., ed.: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Winter 2018 Edition, 2018, 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/cognitive-science, 
[7] Varela, F.J.; Thompson, E. and Rosch, E.: The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and 
Human Experience. 
MIT Press , Cambridge, 1991, 
Loops and recursions in cognitive science: cross-roads between methodology and epistemology 
531 
[8] Damasio, A.R.: The somatic marker hypothesis and the possible functions of the 
prefrontal cortex. 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London B: Biological Sciences, 351(1346), 
1413-1420, 1996, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.1996.0125, 
[9] Strle, T.: Looping Minds: How Cognitive Science Exerts Influence on Its Findings. 
Interdisciplinary Description of Complex Systems 16(4), 533-544, 2018, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.7906.indecs.16.4.2, 
[10] Kolenik, T.: Seeking after the Glitter of Intelligence in the Base Metal of Computing: The 
Scope and Limits of Computational Models in Researching Cognitive Phenomena. 
Interdisciplinary Description of Complex Systems 16(4), 545-557, 2018, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.7906.indecs.16.4.3, 
[11] Malec, M.: Considerations on Scientific Thought Experiments. 
Interdisciplinary Description of Complex Systems 16(4), 558-566, 2018, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.7906.indecs.16.4.4, 
[12] Lukan, P.: Probability and Metaphysics. 
Interdisciplinary Description of Complex Systems 16(4), 567-578, 2018, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.7906.indecs.16.4.5, 
[13] Buks, E.; Schuster, R.; Heiblum, M.; Mahalu, D. and Umansky, V.: Dephasing in electron 
interference by a ‘which-path’detector. 
Nature 391(6670), 871-875, 1998, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/36057, 
[14] Bohr, N.: Atomic Theory and the Description of Nature. 
Cambridge Universtity Press, Cambridge, 1934, 
[15] Orne, M.T.: On the social psychology of the psychological experiment: With particular 
reference to demand characteristics and their implications. 
American Psychologist 17(11), 776-786, 1962, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/h0043424, 
[16] Hurlburt, R.T.; Alderson-Day, B.; Kühn, S. and Fernyhough, C.: Exploring the ecological 
validity of thinking on demand: neural correlates of elicited vs. spontaneously occurring 
inner speech. 
PLoS ONE 11(2), e0147932, 2016, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0147932, 
[17] Roller, M.R. and Lavrakas, P.J.: Applied qualitative research design: A total quality 
framework approach. 
Guilford Publications, New York, 2015, 
[18] Depraz, N.; Varela, F.J. and Vermersch, P.: On becoming aware. 
John Benjamins, Amsterdam, 2003, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/aicr.43, 
[19] Kordeš, U.: A better metaphor for understanding consciousness? 
Interdisciplinary Description of Complex Systems 13(4), 525-533, 2015, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.7906/indecs.13.4.4, 
[20] Kordeš, U. and Demšar, E.: Excavating Belief about Past Experience: Experiential Dynamics of 
the Reflective Act. 
Constructivist Foundations 13(2), 219-229, 2018, 
[21] Hacking, I.: The looping effects of human kinds. 
In: Sperber, D.; Premack, D. and James Premack, A., eds.: Causal cognition: A multidisciplinary 
debate. Oxford University Press, New York, pp.351-394, 1995, 
[22] Strle, T. and Markič, O.: Looping effects of neurolaw, and the precarious marriage 
between neuroscience and the law. 
Balkan Journal of Philosophy 10(1), 17-26, 2018, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/bjp20181013, 
F. Klauser and U. Kordeš 
532 
[23] Friston, K.J. and Stephan, K.E.: Free-energy and the brain. 
Synthese 159(3), 417-458, 2007, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-007-9237-y, 
[24] Brigandt, I. and Love, A.: Reductionism in Biology. 
In: Zalta, E.N., ed.: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Spring 2017 Edition, 2017, 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/reduction-biology, 
[25] Oberheim, E. and Hoyningen-Huene, P.: The Incommensurability of Scientific Theories. 
In: Zalta, E.N., ed.: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Fall 2018 Edition, 2018, 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/incommensurability, 
[26] Di Pellegrino, G.; Fadiga, L.; Fogassi, L.; Gallese, V. and Rizzolatti, G.: Understanding 
motor events: a neurophysiological study. 
Experimental Brain Research 91(1), 176-180, 1992, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00230027, 
[27] Olds, J.: Self-Stimulation of the Brain; its use to study local effects of hunger, sec and drugs. 
Science 127(3294), 315-324, 1958, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.127.3294.315, 
[28] Wise, R.A.: Brain reward circuitry: insights from unsensed incentives. 
Neuron 36(2), 229-240, 2002, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0896-6273(02)00965-0, 
[29] Alexander, B.K.; Coambs, R.B. and Hadaway, P.F.: The effect of housing and gender on 
morphine self-administration in rats. 
Psychopharmacology 58(2), 175-179, 1978, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00426903, 
[30] Russell, B.: Religion and science. 
Oxford University Press, 1997, 
[31] Popper, K.: The logic of scientific discovery. 
Routledge, London, 2005, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203994627, 
[32] Feynman, R.: What is science? 
The Physics Teacher 7(6), 313-320, 1969, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1119/1.2351388, 
[33] Bozarth, M.A.; Murray, A. and Wise, R.A.: Influence of housing conditions on the 
acquisition of intravenous heroin and cocaine self-administration in rats. 
Pharmacology Biochemistry and Behavior 33(4), 903-907, 1989, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0091-3057(89)90490-5, 
[34] Petrie, B.F.: Environment is not the most important variable in determining oral 
morphine consumption in Wistar rats. 
Psychological Reports 78(2), 391-400, 1996, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2466/pr0.1996.78.2.391, 
[35] Di Paolo, E.A.; Rohde, M. and De Jaegher, H.: Horizons for the enactive mind: Values, 
social interaction, and play. 
In: Stewart, J.; Gapenne, O. and Di Paolo, E., eds.: Enaction: towards a new paradigm for 
cognitive science. MIT Press, Cambridge, 2007, 
[36] Riegler, A.: Towards a Radical Constructivist Understanding of Science. 
Foundations of Science 6(1-3), 1-30, 2001, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1011305022115, 
[37] Strle, T.: Embodied, Enacted and Experienced Decision-Making. 
Phainomena XXV(98-99), 83-107, 2016. 
